Main Article Content

Abstract

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah mengkaji makna keadilan dalam perspektif filsafat hukum aliran utilitarianisme dan positivisme; serta menelaah makna ‘benar’ dan ‘adil’ dalam kacamata filsafat hukum. Jenis penelitian ini adalah penelitian hukum dengan menggunakan pendekatan konseptual dan perbandingan; sebagaimana mengkaji isu hukum menggunakan sudut pandang utilitarianisme dan positivisme. Bahan hukum yang digunakan sebagai referensi penelitian adalah bahan hukum dan bahan non-hukum. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa sudut pandang utilitarianisme memandang keadilan dan kebahagiaan sebagai orientasi utama; sehingga, aliran utilitarianisme justru memberikan ruang kepada pemutus hukum untuk mempertimbangkan konsekuensi positif dari suatu perbuatan kejahatan. Sedangkan dalam perspektif positivisme, keadilan dianggap sebagai tujuan utama dari hukum; sebagaimana dilatar belakangi oleh pandangan penganut aliran positivisme yang menyatakan makna keadilan sebenarnya adalah manakala keadilan yang tertinggi adalah ketidakadilan yang tertinggi pula. Kemudian, ‘benar’ dan ‘adil’ dalam pandangan utilitarianisme dan positivism menyatakan bahwa suatu hukum dapat dikatakan adil bila memenuhi unsur konstitutif hukum, bukan hanya unsur regulatif hukum semata (adanya peraturan perundang-undangan tertulis).

Keywords

Keadilan, Utilitarianisme, Positivisme Justice Utilitarianism Positivism

Article Details

How to Cite
Endratno, C. (2022). Refleksi Filsafat Hukum: Telaah Sintesa Keadilan. Yustitiabelen, 8(2), 97-117. https://doi.org/10.36563/yustitiabelen.v8i2.555

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