Refleksi Filsafat Hukum: Telaah Sintesa Keadilan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36563/yustitiabelen.v8i2.555Keywords:
Keadilan, Utilitarianisme, Positivisme, Justice, Utilitarianism, PositivismAbstract
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah mengkaji makna keadilan dalam perspektif filsafat hukum aliran utilitarianisme dan positivisme; serta menelaah makna ‘benar’ dan ‘adil’ dalam kacamata filsafat hukum. Jenis penelitian ini adalah penelitian hukum dengan menggunakan pendekatan konseptual dan perbandingan; sebagaimana mengkaji isu hukum menggunakan sudut pandang utilitarianisme dan positivisme. Bahan hukum yang digunakan sebagai referensi penelitian adalah bahan hukum dan bahan non-hukum. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa sudut pandang utilitarianisme memandang keadilan dan kebahagiaan sebagai orientasi utama; sehingga, aliran utilitarianisme justru memberikan ruang kepada pemutus hukum untuk mempertimbangkan konsekuensi positif dari suatu perbuatan kejahatan. Sedangkan dalam perspektif positivisme, keadilan dianggap sebagai tujuan utama dari hukum; sebagaimana dilatar belakangi oleh pandangan penganut aliran positivisme yang menyatakan makna keadilan sebenarnya adalah manakala keadilan yang tertinggi adalah ketidakadilan yang tertinggi pula. Kemudian, ‘benar’ dan ‘adil’ dalam pandangan utilitarianisme dan positivism menyatakan bahwa suatu hukum dapat dikatakan adil bila memenuhi unsur konstitutif hukum, bukan hanya unsur regulatif hukum semata (adanya peraturan perundang-undangan tertulis).
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References
Augustine, A. (2017). THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE IN ARISTOTLE ’ S PHILOSOPHY : IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIO- POLITCAL LIFE IN NIGERIA, XX(2), 155–169.
Brouwer, R. (2021). Law and Philosophy in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Collard, D. (2006). Research on Well-Being. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36(3), 330–354. Retrieved from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0048393106289795
Dickinson, L. A. (2020). The Rule of Law Under Siege, but Which Rule of Law? Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 12(1), 195–204. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40803-020-00135-1
Disantara, F. P. (2021). Perspektif Keadilan Bermartabat dalam Paradoks Etika dan Hukum. Jurnal Litigasi, 22(2), 205–229.
Dworkin, R. (1994). Law, Philosophy and Interpretation. Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 80(4), 463–475.
Efendi, J., & Ibrahim, J. (2018). Metode Penelitian Hukum: Normatif dan Empiris (Pertama.). Depok: Prenadamedia Group. Retrieved from https://books.google.co.id/books?id=5OZeDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Metode+Penelitian+Hukum:+Normatif+dan+Empiris&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj1sumo86PmAhXkzzgGHZiSDq0Q6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=Metode Penelitian Hukum%3A Normatif dan Empiris&f=false
Fios, F. (2012). Keadilan Hukum Jeremy Bentham dan Relevansinya bagi Praktik Hukum Kontemporer. Humaniora, 3(1), 299. Retrieved from https://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/Humaniora/article/view/3315
Fried, C. (1998). Philosophy Matters. Harvard Law Review, 111(7), 1739. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1342479?origin=crossref
Friedmann, W. (1961). Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking. Columbia Law Review, 61(5), 821. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1120096?origin=crossref
Horn, C. (2020). Aristotle on the Legal and Moral Aspects of Law. Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature (pp. 81–100). De Gruyter. Retrieved from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110699616-005/html
HOROWITZ, D. L. (1997). SELF-DETERMINATION: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND LAW. Nomos, 39, 421–463.
Husik, I. (1924). The Legal Philosophy of Rudolph Stammler. Columbia Law Review, 24(4), 373. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1114196?origin=crossref
Jacobs, S. (1990). Bentham, science and the construction of jurisprudence. History of European Ideas, 12(5), 583–594. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/0191-6599%2890%2990173-C
Johnson, L. D., & Koenig, M. L. (2020). Walk the Line: Aristotle and the Ethics of Narrative. Nevada Law Journal, 20(3), 1039–1074.
Kelly, P. J. (1989). Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: The Civil Law and the Foundations of Bentham’s Economic Thought. Utilitas, 1(1), 62–81. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0953820800000066/type/journal_article
Kolosov, I. V., & Sigalov, K. E. (2020). WAS J. BENTHAM THE FIRST LEGAL UTILITARIAN? RUDN Journal of Law, 24(2), 438–471. Retrieved from http://journals.rudn.ru/law/article/view/23941
Kramer, M. H. (2004). Responsibility in Law and Morality. Philosophical Review, 113(1), 133–135. Retrieved from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article/113/1/133-135/2623
Latipulhayat, A. (2015). Jeremy Bentham. PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law), 2(2), 413–424. Retrieved from http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/pjih/article/view/7342
Marshall, J. B. (1974). PHILOSOPHY AND LAW. Jurimetrics Journal, 14(3), 171.
Moll, W. L., & Stammler, R. (1926). The Theory of Justice. Harvard Law Review.
Naffine, N., & Owens, R. (2019). Intention in Law and Philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Patterson, D. (2018). Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation. Ratio Juris, 31(3), 260–275. Retrieved from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/raju.12216
Paulson, S. L. (1994). Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses. Law and Philosophy, 13(3), 313. Retrieved from http://www.crossref.org/deleted_DOI.html
Pound, R. (1905). Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? Columbia Law Review, 5(5), 339. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1109546?origin=crossref
Radbruch, G. (2006). Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(1), 1–11. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqi041
Radbruch, Gustav. (2020). Law’s Image of the Human. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 40(4), 667–681. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/40/4/667/5927578
Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (2005). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sheppard, S. (1998). The Perfectionisms of John Rawls. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 11(2), 383–415. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0841820900002058/type/journal_article
Summers, R. S. (1963). `Is’ and `Ought’ in Legal Philosophy. The Philosophical Quarterly, 13(51), 157. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.2307/2217191
Tan, S. H. (2021). Radbruch’s Formula Revisited: The Lex Injusta Non Est Lex Maxim in Constitutional Democracies. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 34(2), 461–491. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0841820921000126/type/journal_article
Tasioulas, J. (Ed.). (2020). The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Twining, W. (2019). Bentham’s Theory of Evidence: Setting a Context. Journal of Bentham Studies, 18(1), 20–37. Retrieved from https://scienceopen.com/document?vid=72c80ce1-6261-4b9e-afe8-0663589607c9
Augustine, A. (2017). THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE IN ARISTOTLE ’ S PHILOSOPHY : IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIO- POLITCAL LIFE IN NIGERIA, XX(2), 155–169.
Brouwer, R. (2021). Law and Philosophy in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Collard, D. (2006). Research on Well-Being. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36(3), 330–354. Retrieved from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0048393106289795
Dickinson, L. A. (2020). The Rule of Law Under Siege, but Which Rule of Law? Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 12(1), 195–204. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40803-020-00135-1
Disantara, F. P. (2021). Perspektif Keadilan Bermartabat dalam Paradoks Etika dan Hukum. Jurnal Litigasi, 22(2), 205–229.
Dworkin, R. (1994). Law, Philosophy and Interpretation. Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 80(4), 463–475.
Efendi, J., & Ibrahim, J. (2018). Metode Penelitian Hukum: Normatif dan Empiris (Pertama.). Depok: Prenadamedia Group. Retrieved from https://books.google.co.id/books?id=5OZeDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Metode+Penelitian+Hukum:+Normatif+dan+Empiris&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj1sumo86PmAhXkzzgGHZiSDq0Q6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=Metode Penelitian Hukum%3A Normatif dan Empiris&f=false
Fios, F. (2012). Keadilan Hukum Jeremy Bentham dan Relevansinya bagi Praktik Hukum Kontemporer. Humaniora, 3(1), 299. Retrieved from https://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/Humaniora/article/view/3315
Fried, C. (1998). Philosophy Matters. Harvard Law Review, 111(7), 1739. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1342479?origin=crossref
Friedmann, W. (1961). Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking. Columbia Law Review, 61(5), 821. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1120096?origin=crossref
Horn, C. (2020). Aristotle on the Legal and Moral Aspects of Law. Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature (pp. 81–100). De Gruyter. Retrieved from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110699616-005/html
HOROWITZ, D. L. (1997). SELF-DETERMINATION: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND LAW. Nomos, 39, 421–463.
Husik, I. (1924). The Legal Philosophy of Rudolph Stammler. Columbia Law Review, 24(4), 373. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1114196?origin=crossref
Jacobs, S. (1990). Bentham, science and the construction of jurisprudence. History of European Ideas, 12(5), 583–594. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/0191-6599%2890%2990173-C
Johnson, L. D., & Koenig, M. L. (2020). Walk the Line: Aristotle and the Ethics of Narrative. Nevada Law Journal, 20(3), 1039–1074.
Kelly, P. J. (1989). Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: The Civil Law and the Foundations of Bentham’s Economic Thought. Utilitas, 1(1), 62–81. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0953820800000066/type/journal_article
Kolosov, I. V., & Sigalov, K. E. (2020). WAS J. BENTHAM THE FIRST LEGAL UTILITARIAN? RUDN Journal of Law, 24(2), 438–471. Retrieved from http://journals.rudn.ru/law/article/view/23941
Kramer, M. H. (2004). Responsibility in Law and Morality. Philosophical Review, 113(1), 133–135. Retrieved from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article/113/1/133-135/2623
Latipulhayat, A. (2015). Jeremy Bentham. PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law), 2(2), 413–424. Retrieved from http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/pjih/article/view/7342
Marshall, J. B. (1974). PHILOSOPHY AND LAW. Jurimetrics Journal, 14(3), 171.
Moll, W. L., & Stammler, R. (1926). The Theory of Justice. Harvard Law Review.
Naffine, N., & Owens, R. (2019). Intention in Law and Philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Patterson, D. (2018). Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation. Ratio Juris, 31(3), 260–275. Retrieved from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/raju.12216
Paulson, S. L. (1994). Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses. Law and Philosophy, 13(3), 313. Retrieved from http://www.crossref.org/deleted_DOI.html
Pound, R. (1905). Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? Columbia Law Review, 5(5), 339. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1109546?origin=crossref
Radbruch, G. (2006). Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(1), 1–11. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqi041
Radbruch, Gustav. (2020). Law’s Image of the Human. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 40(4), 667–681. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/40/4/667/5927578
Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (2005). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sheppard, S. (1998). The Perfectionisms of John Rawls. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 11(2), 383–415. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0841820900002058/type/journal_article
Summers, R. S. (1963). `Is’ and `Ought’ in Legal Philosophy. The Philosophical Quarterly, 13(51), 157. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.2307/2217191
Tan, S. H. (2021). Radbruch’s Formula Revisited: The Lex Injusta Non Est Lex Maxim in Constitutional Democracies. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 34(2), 461–491. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0841820921000126/type/journal_article
Tasioulas, J. (Ed.). (2020). The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Twining, W. (2019). Bentham’s Theory of Evidence: Setting a Context. Journal of Bentham Studies, 18(1), 20–37. Retrieved from https://scienceopen.com/document?vid=72c80ce1-6261-4b9e-afe8-0663589607c9
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